The Road to Peace


by Helga Zepp-LaRouche


Translated speech by Helga Zepp-LaRouche, Chairman
of the Solidarity Civil Rights Movement (Buergerrechtsbewegung
Solidaritaet), to EIR's seminar in Berlin, on Dec. 18.

Yes, I would like to speak today on the subject of the economic
debate which occurred during the early 1930s--which is normally a
taboo subject nowadays. What I hope will become clear from what I
shall say: one of the most astounding phenomena is the fact that
today, virtually not a word is spoken about the discussions which
went on during the early 1930s, and the fact that hardly anyone
today knows anything about those discussions.

Today, the system of globalization, of the free-market economy,
is hopelessly bankrupt. And anyone who has not yet recognized
that fact, I would ask them to please read a speech by one of the
U.S. Federal Reserve governors, a man by the name of Ben S.
Bernanke, who a few weeks ago delivered an astounding speech
which, at the moment, is the hottest topic among all the top
insiders in London, Wall Street, and Zurich, because he committed
the absolutely monstrous violation of a taboo, by saying that
today, with all our modern tools for increasing the money supply,
it is much simpler to create liquidity in so many ways, than it
was during the times when one needed an old-fashioned printing
press in order to print the stuff; and that this is basically
possible today through all sorts of electronic means. And by
doing so, he basically blurted out the marketeers' best-kept
secret up to now, namely, that if the system is reaching the end
of its rope, and a domino effect is becoming a real threat, with
large banks going bankrupt, mega-corporations going bankrupt,
bubbles popping, and then the so-called aggregate risk, i.e., if
one market sector goes bankrupt, then, because of the
interconnectedness of all market segments, the entire global
system blows up--that then, the last remaining resort, is to
print money--just as the Reichsbank did in 1923, only today with
the difference that back then, as you know, it was confined to
Germany, whereas today, because of globalization, the effect is
worldwide. And as we ought to recall from past history,
hyperinflation--because this Mr. Bernanke was talking about
nothing else but that--is what robs the man in the street, the
little people, of their their last scrap of savings.
Hyperinflation gobbles it all up.

And that's precisely where we're at right now. Latin America was
already mentioned: Argentina has halted its payments on its
foreign debt, and has said, "We're not going to pay any more."
Now, that was only $800 million, but the important aspect of it,
was its effect as a signal that the country is facing the utter
disintegration of its territory, and so they have said, "That's
it! No more!"

The situation in Brazil is dramatic. On Jan. 1, the new President
"Lula" will be sworn into office. There is rampant hysteria over
what Brazil is going to do with its $500 billion foreign debt. My
husband was right, when he said that no other country is a better
demonstration of how hopelessly, unsalvageably bankrupt this
system is. Because Brazil has two options: either it capitulates,
and makes an attempt to fulfill the IMF conditionalities, in
which case it will, in short order, go the way of Argentina,
i.e., the country will collapse; or, it will will say "No!" and
in that case the IMF is equally finished, because the sheer
amount of [Brazil's] indebtedness, $500 billion, is enough to
bring some mega-banks in the United States, but also in Spain and
elsewhere, to their knees.

But in Japan it's even worse: bank crisis, depression everywhere
you look.

The actual epicenter of the crisis shifted to the United States
some time ago. America's infrastructure is disintegrating, and it
is facing the prospect of no longer having a railway or airway
system, because if United Airlines, which declared bankruptcy
last Monday, goes the same way as PanAm, Braniff, and other
airlines, then it's well on its way to being liquidated,
and--well, I guess you'll still be able to get around the country
in a Greyhound bus, or on foot, but that might not be
particularly efficient!

The collapse of the dollar was already mentioned. We are
currently basically in the final {weeks}--my husband has said,
very courageously (as he normally is, anyway) that the world
financial system is so far gone in its collapse, that we're
talking about a matter of weeks, about January, about only a few
months. And this is, without a doubt, what is shaping the main
dynamics of the economic crisis here in Germany--even though, of
course, there do also exist some home-made problems as well,
which have to do with the general cultural paradigm-shift over
the past 35 years.

You will recall that about one month after the election, the
re-election of the Schroeder government, comparisons with the
Bruening government were being made, on the one side, by Mr.
[Oskar] Lafontaine [of the Social Democratic Party], who said
that [German Finance Minster Hans] Eichel's austerity policy is
the same as what Bruening did--and Bruening is the person who
paved the way for Hitler, whose austerity policy brought on the
collapse of the Weimar Republic.

But Bruening has also been brought up by the
right-wing-populist Prof. Arnulf Baring, who even went so far as
as to call for the trashing of Germany's Constitution, demanding
that the Basic Law be revised, because unfortunately it does not
contain an Article 48--i.e., the clause which made it possible
for Bruening to issue his Emergency Decrees. And Baring also
called for people to take to the streets, and to man the
barricades in order to topple the current government. So, he's
been quite the radical.

Back then-- I would like to examine this historical period a bit
more closely. All this might perhaps be well-known to some of
you, but I shall say some things that are perhaps not so
well-known to you-- Back then, during the era of Mueller, of
the Mueller government, and through Bruening, to von Papen,
to von Schleicher, the failure of democracy was quite evident to
all, because no party in the Reichstag had a concept of how to
deal with the collapse of the liberal system. And part and parcel
of this liberal system, was, of course, the war reparations
payments which Germany had to pay. At the point when the grand
coalition under Mueller collapsed, this led to a series of
presidial regimes, each of which failed in turn. And von
Schleicher, who {theoretically} could have averted the
catastrophe, came into power much too late, in December 1932, at
a point when the Anglo-Americans' pressure on Schacht to bring
Hitler to power, was much too great, and the situation was just
too far gone to change course.

We're in a similar situation today: None of the parties has any
idea what to do. The systemic collapse today is far worse than
the Great Depression of the 1930s, but there are certain
parallels: We've taken the charts of stock prices from 1918 to
1940, and have superimposed these onto those from 1980 to the
present, and in fact the curves match perfectly.

But the systemic crisis today is far, far worse. Two continents
have already collapsed {de facto}--Africa, and we are already
witnessing the traumatic disintegration of Latin America. Back
then, America was the biggest lender; today, on the other hand,
America is the biggest {debtor} in the financial market history.

The danger, therefore, is that chaos, or even a revamped version
of Article 48, or perhaps a dictatorship, is looming on the

I would therefore like to set this forth at the outset: Our
position is to seek to defend this Schroeder government--not
because Schroeder's economic policies are any great shakes, but
because in the present constellation of forces, Germany, and even
Schroeder himself, with all his problems, has become the
fulcrum of opposition to a new Bruening policy. And therefore
we must see to it, that we change Schroeder's policies, and not
replace him altogether.

Because what's at stake here, is quite clear: Schroeder himself
is still undecided. He can decide this way, or that way: He can,
like Thomas Schmidt (whose past is extremely interesting, by the
way, in the 1960s and 1970s), who writes today in the
{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}, that if Schroeder, with cool
calculation, sets into motion the systematic undermining of the
social state, then he couldn't be touched by his competition, and
so he should show leadership in dismantling the social state--so
proposes Thomas.

Because you must consider the fact that none other than an
individual by the name of Peregrine Worsthorne--who,
interestingly, is the stepson of Montagu Norman, the man who
financed Hitler and brought him to power, the former head of the
Bank of England--wrote already back on April 2, 1996, in the
{Sunday Telegraph}: "I'm not saying that we must move directly
from the social state into a police state," but "{welfarism} is
an idea whose time has passed.... For many of `our people,' life
in the late 20th and in the 21st Century will be repulsive,
brutal, and short as well." And this, of course, is a reference
to the life-shortening health-care reforms which enter the
picture whenever the social-welfare state starts being

A very interesting article was written on Nov. 24 of this year by
a certain Prof. Herbert Giersch in {Welt am Sonntag}. Professor
Giersch was formerly one of the "Five Wise Men," headed up the
World Economic Institute in Kiel, and is a neo-liberal of the
Mont Pelerin Society stripe; but nevertheless, he writes the
following in his article on the current economic situation:

"Seventy years ago, when the worldwide economic crisis erupted, a
group of noted economists of various persuasions, including
Wagemann, Woytinsky, Baade, Lautenbach, Lombard, Loewe, and
Lederer sought to build enthusiasm among the political class and
in public opinion, for its policy of active government
expenditures. Quite probably it could have cost the National
Socialist their victory in the Summer of 1932."

I don't know whether it's clear to you, what a tremendous
bombshell that statement is. It means that for the first time, a
so-called regular professor--albeit a retired one, but still a
quite regular one--has stated something which before then has
only been stated in that precise form by Mr. LaRouche, by myself,
and by the BueSo generally, namely, that if Germany's economic
policy had been changed in time, Hitler's rise to power could
have been prevented.

One would assume that this is a theme which would be of great
interest in Germany--so one would assume. Because at the time,
there existed a broad coalition of social forces--the so-called
reformers, whose members during the early 1930s included the
General German Trade Union Alliance (Allgemeine Deutsche
Gewerkschaftsbund, ADGB), and also a group of economists around
such people as Lautenbach--who at the time was a high official in
the Economics Ministry--but also industrial bankers--all of whom
were proposing varying concepts of how unemployment could be
eliminated through the generation of productive credit.

And let us recall that at precisely the same time, namely around
1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt in America was implementing his New
Deal policy, which included productive credit generation, and led
America out of the Depression. One can truly say today, that if
the same policy had won the day in Germany--that is, the policy
which Woytinsky and Lautenbach were urging--Hitler would not have
seized power, and World War II probably wouldn't have had to

And this makes it all the more astounding, that this economic
debate, which raged from 1930 to 1932, is almost completely swept
under the rug in Germany today. Instead we get the widespread
myth that it was the Nazis, and Hjalmar Schacht and Hitler, whose
job-creation programs succeeded in eliminating unemployment.
Nothing can be further from the truth--as I shall now elaborate.

On June 28, 1928, Mueller formed his grand coalition. The stock
market crashed in 1929, and in 1930 a crisis erupted within the
coalition over how to finance unemployment insurance, leading to
Mueller's resignation. In March 1930, there were 537,000 more
unemployed than there had been in March 1929. Then, on March 30,
Hindenburg assigned Bruening the task of forming a new
coalition government. After Bruening entered office, the annual
increase in unemployment climbed to 1,432,000 in April, and then,
after the first Emergency Decrees, to 2 million. After Bruening
implemented further deflationary measures in December 1930,
unemployment in March 1931 was 2.8 million higher than it had
been in March 1929. On Dec. 8, 1931 there was yet another
Emergency Decree, which included wage cuts by up to 10%, drastic
price cuts, and a 6% ceiling on interest rates. And the number of
unemployed kept on rising, to 6 million in March 1932.

On the heels of this came the election victory of the NSDAP
[National Socialist German Workers Party, or Nazis], which on
July 31 won 37.4% of the popular vote, entitling them to 230
seats in the Reichstag, making them the country's strongest
political force.

During this period of high drama, stretching from 1930 up through
early 1933, there were various forces which presented ideas on
how to revive the economy. The most important role was that
played, on the one side, by the General German Trade Union
Alliance, which had approximately 5 million members, making it
the biggest single organization in Germany: 80% of all organized
workers belonged to it. And the leading intellect behind these
proposals was Wladimir Woytinsky, who was chief of the ADGB's
Statistical Department, and who had emigrated to Germany from St.
Petersburg in 1922, and who had been leading the Statistical
Department since 1929.

In the Spring of 1931, Woytinsky proposed an international
program to end the economic crisis. To begin with, he asserted
the idea that Bruening's deflation policy was only making the
crisis worse. He wrote a number of articles about this, and in
1931 he published a book, in which he pointed out the
qualitatively new character of the worldwide economic crisis,
whereby the so-called automatic capitalist mechanisms no longer
functioned, but whereby only anti-deflation measures could be
agreed upon by consenting nations, thereby making it possible to
increase purchasing power. And this additional purchasing power
would have to be applied productively, i.e., put toward the
creation of new jobs in public projects.

Woytinsky harshly attacked the mania for cutting wages and social
services (today, we could call it the "Eichel-cutting mania"*),
and on March 9, 1931 there was an executive board meeting of the
ADGB, at which Fritz Tarnow, chairman of the Woodworkers Union
and ADGB plenipotentiary for job-creation programs, along with
Wilhelm Eggert, called for an international program to end the
world economic crisis.

Woytinsky published his first major articles in June 1931, in the
theoretical journal {Die Arbeit}, where he pleaded with the ADGB
to adopt an active economic policy. He wrote:

"Labor organizations that rely on the self-healing forces of the
capitalist economic order, run the risk of slowly bleeding to
death. For some years now, Germany's working people have been
waging a difficult, defensive struggle, and the worse the crisis
becomes, the more unfavorable the conditions will become under
which that fight is waged. Our labor organizations have lost
their freedom to maneuver; no longer can they choose either the
time or the objective of their conflict with the adversary. They
are forced, each time, to fight whenever and wherever it best
suits the other side....

"Targetted, far-reaching measures to revive the economy have
never been more necessary than they are right now. The labor
movement needs an {economic-policy action program,} which can
show workers and other layers of the population, that the Social
Democracy and the trade unions see a way out of the economic
abyss. But at present, we have no economic-policy action program;
all that we have, is a list of social demands, which we try our
best to get adopted. We have definite positions on assorted
individual economic policy questions. But a {program,} this we
don't have!''

He then demands that the ADGB take a pro-active stance on
economic policy--i.e., instead of a passive "meterological"
attitude of mere observation, an active attitude such as in the
practice of medicine, whose task is to heal the sick, to reduce
suffering, and to halt the spread of disease; and economic
research ought to be guided by similar objectives. There must be
"factors brought into play, which will spur every entrepreneur to
expand their field of economic activity. In accordance with this,
we must explore opportunities to complement inadequate economic
initiatives taken by private firms, with public job creation."
Agreements must be made among nations for increasing purchasing
power. What is required, is a creative offensive, and not merely
defensive skirmishes.

To counter the argument that such an active intervention would be
inflationary, Woytinsky wrote:

"But, on similar grounds, in the treatment of a serious,
life-threatening illness, one would rule out the administration
of a medicine, solely because it is a {poison.} The physician,
however, does not hesitate to use various poisons as
medicines.... If the physician had to renounce all use of
poisonous substances as medicines, he would be condemned to the
same impotence as that of an economic policy which, out of fear
of inflation, rejects all anti-deflationary measures out of

And thus the only remaining option is an active conjunctural
policy which takes on the worldwide economic crisis. And
therefore, a worldwide economic policy is required.

He writes: "All nations are suffering because the world economy
is sick. Therefore they must all concentrate their powers upon
taken joint action to overcome the world crisis." Today, we would
call this the Eurasian Land-Bridge.

In Point 3 of this action program, he writes:

"No country is ... harder hit by the worldwide crisis, than
Germany is; and within Germany, working people are the class that
suffers most from the economic depression. In keeping with this,
it is Germany which must take the initiative in forceful
international policy to combat the world crisis, and the German
working class (trade unions and Social Democracy) must claim and
assume the role of conveyor of the idea of an activist world
economic policy."

In Point 6 he writes:

"The funds freed up by international money-creation policies,
must be applied toward job creation, and for the realization of a
grand plan for European reconstruction."

That's the 1930s version of what we proposed for Europe in 1989
with the Productive Triangle, and of what the Eurasian
Land-Bridge represents for Europe today.

On Dec. 31, 1931, Woytinsky, Fritz Tarnow, chairman of the
Woodworkers Union, and Fritz Baade, the agricultural policy
spokesman of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) faction in the
Reichstag, published their "Theses on Combatting the Economic
Crisis," and presented them to the ADGB's executive committee. It
contained the proposal to create new jobs for 1 million
unemployed, and to that end, a sum of 2 billion reichsmarks was
to be made available in the form of a cash loan from the

On Jan. 26, 1932, the so-called job-creation program, dubbed the
"WTB Plan"--for Woytinsky, Tarnow, and Baade--was presented,
which included the idea of issuing long-term credits with low
rates of interest and amortization; such credits would then be
cashed in by Reichskredit AG, and they would be discountable at
the Reichsbank.

The ADGB voted to adopt the WTB Plan, but the SPD under Otto
Wels, along with the SPD's so-called economic experts Hilferding,
Naphtali, and Bauer, were opposed to it. As Woytinsky wrote later
on in his autobiography:

"It seems to me that I saw--physically, with my eyes--how
Bruening was leading Germany to a tragic end.... Bruening,
however, must not be blamed altogether harshly for his errors. He
shared his false ideas with many of his advisers in his own and
the Social Democratic Party. Had the latter not supported his
policy, he might have abandoned it."

That's what was going on on the trade-union side. In parallel to
that, on Sept. 16-17, a secret conference was held by the
Friedrich List Society, with Dr. Wilhelm Lautenbach, Reichsbank
President Hans Luther, SPD economist Rudolf Hilferding, and
others in attendance. And there Lautenbach presented his
extremely important--I can really only recommend that each and
every one of you thoroughly read this memorandum, titled
"Possibilities for Reviving Economic Activity, by Means of
Investment and Expansion of Credit." Lautenbach wrote there: "The
natural course for overcoming economic and financial emergency,"
is "not to limit economic activity, but to increase it, because
the market, in the current conditions of simultaneous depression
and world monetary crisis, no longer intervenes."

Normal market mechanisms are no longer adequate; they do not
provide any positive directives. He writes:

"For, at this very moment, we have the paradoxical situation,
that, despite the fact that we have made extraordinary cuts in
production, demand is still continually lagging behind supply.
And thus, we have chronic production surpluses, which we don't
know what to do with. The task of finding some way to turn these
surpluses into things of value, is the real, and most urgent
problem for our economic policy to solve; and, in principle, it
is relatively simple to do that: Surpluses of physical goods,
unutilized productive plant, and unutilized labor power can be
applied toward meeting a new economic need--a need which, from an
economic standpoint, represents a capital investment. We can
conceive of such tasks, as ... public works, or works carried out
with public backing, which for the economy would mean an increase
in our national wealth, and which would have to be done anyway,
once normal conditions returned (road construction, desirable
improvements and expansion of the railway system, and the

"With such an investment and credit policy, the imbalance between
supply and demand on the domestic market will be remedied, and
all production will once again be given a direction and a goal.
If, however, we fail to institute such a policy, we are headed
for inevitable, continued further collapse, and the complete
gutting of our national economy, moving into a situation that
will force us, in order to avert a domestic catastrophe, into
taking on short-term public debt purely for purposes of
consumption; whereas today, it is still within our power, to
pre-empt this credit for productive purposes, and thereby to
bring both our economy and our public finances back into

He was saying that we have two possibilities: Either we create
credit right now for investment, or else, in very short order we
will have to do it anyway, but merely in order to finance
unemployment--exactly the situation we have today.

Hans Schaeffer, state secretary in the Finance Ministry, lent
his full support to the Lautenbach Plan, and as late as September
1933 wrote a memorandum about it. A similar proposal was also
made by Ernst Wagemann, head of the Reich Statistical Office and
of the Institute for Conjunctural Research. In January 1932 he
published a great number of copies of his own plan, which
involved the creation of 3 billion reichsmarks for the creation
of jobs.

This theme went very much in favor of the reformers at the time,
because of the crisis during the Summer of 1931, which had thrown
the entirety of the Reichsbank Law, and also the Young Plan for
reparations payments, into the wastepaper basket, because
everything was coming apart--just as the Maastricht Treaty and
its Stability Pact is flying apart today. For, it is precisely at
points when such apparently set-in-stone situations become
unsustainable, that such reforms can actually be implemented.

On Jan. 29, 1932, Schaeffer wrote in his diary that the
Chancellor--i.e., Bruening--was particularly incensed over
Wagemann, because the latter had claimed he had created the
impression with the trade unions that there existed some means
other than the deflation policy, to improve the situation. And
secondly, Wagemann's proposals could spell big trouble for the
reparations payment program.

What he is referring to here, is the fact that many historians
today have surmised that with his deflation policy, Bruening
wanted to intentionally ruin the economy in order to make the
point that Germany could not pay the reparations. At the time,
there were indeed negotiations for debt relief, the so-called
Hoover Moratorium. But that came too late for Bruening, and
this terrified him; he had an image of himself as a marathon
runner, who was only 100 meters away from the finish-line, but
who couldn't run the final stretch.

And thirdly, Schaeffer wrote in his diary, it is to be feared
that the National Socialists, who up to then had sought in vain
for a credible monetary policy, would adopt Wagemann's plan, and
could derive an advantage therefrom.

But that was by no means the actual situation, because all of the
proposals for reform had been made by democrats--by Social
Democrats, by trade unionists--and not by the National
Socialists, who then, in the Nov. 6, 1932 elections, came in with
2 million fewer votes than previously. Hitler himself expressed
thoughts of suicide as an ultimate option, in the event that the
movement collapsed.

Von Papen was to form a new government in November 1932, and he
made the insane proposal to dissolve the Reichstag, and to base
his support solely on the Reichswehr (army). General von
Schleicher warned Hindenburg that in view of the right-left
confontation, this would lead to civil war. Hindenburg wanted to
name von Papen Chancellor nevertheless, but all but two members
of his cabinet voted for von Schleicher instead.

Von Schleicher was installed as the Weimar Republic's last
Chancellor on Dec. 2, 1932. He was firmly convinced that the
republic could only be defended by forming a broad-based alliance
of the labor movement and the Reichswehr. And beginning in
November 1932, he sought to build this so-called "Diagonal
Front," a broad coalition of diverse social forces which,
together, could implement this economic stimulation program.

Theodor Leipart, the chairman of the ADGB, was in favor of this
Diagonal Front. The German Catholic Trade Union Movement, both
the Christian Trade Union and the Free Trade Union, the
Reichsbanner [militia arm of the Social Democratic Party], the
German Retail Employees Union, the Stahlhelm, the German
Association of Municipalities and Counties under its President
Dr. Gerecke--all of these people were prepared to support von
Schleicher in carrying out this program. Dr. Gerecke himself had
worked out a job-creation program for the von Schleicher
government, one which was in line with the proposals made by the
Luebeck industrialist Draeger and his circle.

Draeger had made similar proposals: He wanted to first make 3
billion reichsmarks available, and if this test were successful,
then an additional 5 billion, and ultimately a total of 10-20
billion reichsmarks over the course of the decade. But
unfortunately this plan was not adopted, and although von
Schleicher did issue a very notable government declaration on
Dec. 15, 1932, the stupidity of the Social Democrats became one
of the chief domestic reasons why it failed. Specifically, Rudolf
Breitscheid, leader of the SPD's parliamentary faction, stated at
the time: "We're not going to hold any talks with a reactionary

And then, on Jan. 11, 1933, the SPD expresly forbade ADGB
Chairman Leipart from holding any further discussions with von
Schleicher. As is well-known, three weeks later came Hitler's
seizure of power--an act accomplished with the assistance of
Hjalmar Schacht and certain Anglo-American financial circles.

But today we can say with absolute certainty, that if Woytinsky's
proposals, and those of Lautenbach, had been implemented in 1931,
the conditions would not have existed for two years as they did,
making it possible for the Nazis to seize power. And if von
Schleicher had had even a mere six months' time to implement his
program, the same would have been true. Which is to say that if,
in Germany, people had been able to follow the same policy as
Franklin Delano Roosevelt in America, in all foreseeable
probability, World War II would have never happened.

And if we are to learn {anything at all} from this history, we
should really say the following: If people are already talking
now about Bruening, if people people are already talking now
about the Lautenbach Plan and the other reforms, then it is high
time for us today to study the mistakes of the 1930s, so that we
do not repeat those failed policies. Today we have, in the form
of the New Bretton Woods proposal, the Eurasian Land-Bridge,
quite concrete proposals as to how the Lautenbach-Woytinsky
Initiative can be implemented.

And that is not just whistling in the dark: By a majority vote,
the Italian Parliament has already voted its approval of my
husband's proposal for a new financial system, one that is
oriented not toward speculation, but rather toward production.
The Italian Super-Economics Minister Tremonti, who is also
directly influenced by my husband's ideas, has called for a "New
Deal" for Europe. My husband has already spoken today about how
the Russia-China-India Strategic Triangle is already working
together; and thus, within the Eurasian Land-Bridge, we would
have an entirely natural orientation for German export markets.

I think we are in a situation today, in which we shall {not} have
the situation where, 70 years from now, someone will be asking:
"Why weren't these proposals adopted in 2002/2003, either?" and
where no one knows what the outcome might be. Today, the main
threat is chaos, and worldwide collapse.

I would like to urgently call upon you all--my husband has
already said "Help me," and I say the same: "Help me, too, to
implement this policy in Germany, and, for starters, to lead a
broad public debate about this 1930-33 period, and about the
options that existed at that time, and to draw the right
conclusions from it."


* Untranslatable pun: The German Finance Minister's last name
Eichel also means "acorn" or "the head of the male penis."

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